Abstract
Imitation and shame refer to social models within which one fixes the desire for recognition. As the desire for recognition becomes the social object of defined intersubjective relationships, in the meanwhile, this objectification works on itself acquiring, accordingly, an excess of value. In order to give significance to this overvaluation, the desire for recognition requires necessarily more articulated fields of experiential and theoretical expression. Reconfiguring such excess value in view of a critical theory of recognition is a too difficult challenge to took up here. Rather this contribution aims to advance some minor remarks. Firstly I intend to deal with the preliminary analysis of whether the human desire should be treated as a desire of the other (I), and whether it is always possible to reduce human desire to desire for recognition (II). In a second step, demonstrating the weakness of the previous reduction, I introduce the phenomena of imitation and shame as examples of almost dialectics of recognition (III).

Keywords: Hegel, Desire, Recognition, Shame, Mimetic Desire