ABSTRACT: In his book L’Imagination, Jean-Paul Sartre develops a strict critique of Henri Bergson’s theory of image, revealing the inexpressive and unintentional nature of bersonian consciousness. Upon closer inspection, this argumentation shows the conflict between two different psychological conceptions: an impressionist description of consciousness and an expressionist one. If, in Bergson’s theory, each distance among subject and object seems to be denied – in conformity with the modalities of an alimentary psychology, which exhibits an immediate contact (in-pression) with the world –, according to Sartre, the idea of an ontological distance (ex-pression) would assure a more effectual and efficient contact with external reality. Therefore, should we conclude that bergsonian consciousness is nothing more than hallucination or illusion? On the contrary, important observations, presented in Matière et Mémoire and Effort intellectuel, show that consciousness could perform its functions, in perception and memory, only through an expressive movement.

KEYWORDS: H. Bergson, J.-P. Sartre, consciousness, image, Expressionism/Impressionism.