

A_{I2}

Web content



A special thanks to Professor Michael Dziedzic for his friendship and support.

Danilo Ciampini

Extensive Network Organizational Model

Preface by
Michael Dziedzic





Aracne editrice

www.aracneeditrice.it
info@aracneeditrice.it

Copyright © MMXIX
Gioacchino Onorati editore S.r.l. – unipersonale

www.gioacchinoonoratieditore.it
info@gioacchinoonoratieditore.it

via Vittorio Veneto, 20
00020 Canterano (RM)
(06) 4551463

ISBN 978-88-255-2362-1

*No part of this book may be reproduced
by print, photoprint, microfilm, microfiche, or any other means,
without publisher's authorization.*

Ist edition: April 2019

*To my Family
Katia, Francesco and Benedetta
for your love*

Contents

| | |
|----|--|
| 9 | <i>Preface</i> |
| 13 | <i>Introduction</i> |
| 21 | Chapter I <i>Post–Cold War Developments</i> 1.1. Different Types of Conflict, 21. |
| 27 | Chapter II <i>Organizational Models</i> 2.1. Classical Organizational Models, 27 – 2.2. Atypical Organizational Models, 28 – 2.3. Critical Mass, 33 – 2.4. The Motivational Factor, 36 – 2.5. Application in Operative Terms, 38 – 2.6. Containment Activity, 40. |
| 43 | Chapter III <i>The Importance of Human Resources</i> 3.1. The <i>Multinational Specialized Units</i> (MSU) Within the Carabinieri, 43 – 3.2. The “Carabiniere Model”, 46 – 3.2.1. <i>Recent Developments: EUROGENDFOR, Stability Policing and NATO SP COE</i> , 48 – 3.3. An Open Mindset, 51. |
| 57 | Chapter IV <i>Territory Control</i> 4.1. Applicable Standards, 57 – 4.2. Patrolling and Recce Activities, 57 – 4.3. Gathering Information, 59 – 4.4. Territorial Presence, 61 – 4.5. The Extensive Network Model, 69. |

| | |
|----|------------------------------------|
| 77 | <i>Conclusions</i> |
| 79 | <i>Annex – Development</i> |
| 87 | <i>Appendix – About the Author</i> |
| 93 | <i>References</i> |

Preface

Michael Dziedzic*

Skillfully weaving together relevant tenets from military strategists Clausewitz and Douhet, from peacebuilding precepts, and from organizational theory, Danilo Ciampini has provided an erudite, compelling, and practical analysis of the organizational constructs that are most apt for addressing contemporary security challenges. After extracting lessons from recent cases in Rwanda, Kosovo, and Georgia, he makes a very fundamental point that military forces alone are incapable of coping with the novel threats that recurrently confound us today. These contemporaneous threats are diverse, ranging from “little green men” with a veneer of deniability who are insinuated into a neighboring state to generate or exacerbate conflict, aspiring terrorists who are secreted into refugee flows, and illicit power structures that obstruct or delegitimize international interventions that are dedicated to stabilizing internal conflicts. As Ciampini argues these «[...] new crisis situations require a careful reflection about the characteristics and capabilities of the specific units to be deployed in areas that have been destabilized or where security gaps prevail.»

This monograph carefully elaborates an «extensive network organizational model» that is relevant for «homeland

* Peace Institute of Washington.

security/defense and for activities conducted outside the national territory to legitimate host nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy». The core components of this organizational model — coverage, territorial scope, and progressive expansion — are carefully elaborated. The benefits of this model are persuasive, including engagement with the population (which is essential for community policing to understand and address localized security concerns) and the ability to monitor and expose threats to the mission (which is critical for intelligence-led policing).

This monograph could not have been published at a more propitious moment since the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) is about to conclude an assessment of whether the Alliance should develop a stability policing capability pursuant to the 2016 Warsaw Summit Declaration that the allies «seek to contribute more to the efforts of the international community in projecting stability and strengthening security outside our territory, thereby contributing to Alliance security overall»¹. In order to meet this directive, NATO is considering the development of a stability policing capability. If NATO decides to do this, the extensive network organizational model should be carefully examined as a construct that provides multiple benefits, especially the synergy it provides for community policing and intelligence-led policing which are essential components of any stabilization process.

One very interesting concept introduced by Ciampini is the need for intervening stability police forces to have an

1. *Warsaw Summit Communiqué*, Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8–9 July 2016, June 9, 2106. Available at http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm.

“open mindset”. He defines this as «a mindset rooted in the knowledge and memory of being a citizen, a soldier, and guardian of the law». This mindset imbues Carabinieri cadres with the ability

to carry out independent tasks, reacting to unknown circumstances autonomously such as to counter actions by opponents and enjoy the upper hand because they can rely on military capabilities and a deeply rooted military spirit tightly connected with the life of society in the country in all its many manifestations.

He describes this as a product of Carabinieri heritage and tradition. Hopefully, one of the next topics for Ciampini’s penetrating analytical capabilities will be to examine how to pass this ethos on to prospective allies in future interventions and, most decisively, the internal security forces in countries that have been wracked by internal conflict.

Introduction

Foreword

Rapid changes on the international stage together with ever-increasing new crisis situations require a careful reflection about the characteristics and capabilities of the specific units to be deployed in areas that have been destabilized or where security gaps prevail. These *gaps* can encompass at any given moment a broad range of interventions, from armed interventions for peace-keeping purposes to technical and humanitarian assistance.

This is ideal workspace for the armed forces, police corps, state institutions or civilian organizations. This is a very diverse range of intervention units, differing in terms of organization, roles as well as specific objectives.

The situation is further complicated by changes these last fifteen years in combat methodologies, themselves challenging decades-old benchmarks in this area.

This warrants careful reconsideration about possible new catalytic factors allowing the selection of adequate response capabilities in a context marked by heterogeneous and innovative threats. It is necessary to define and specify the basic criteria for deployment and the bigger-picture theoretical characteristics of the units to be deployed when facing such new threats.

The End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War instilled a new optimism worldwide and hope in a new era of peace. This hope was sustained in the beginning by events such as the reduction of nuclear weapons (e.g. the signature of the INF *Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty* on 8th December 1987).

The illusion brought by the treaty of an end to nuclear conflict aroused the hope that the international community would be able to muster sufficient will to resolve conflicts by diplomacy and peaceful means «considering the positive effects on the world of significant and verifiable reductions of nuclear arsenals at the turn of the 21st century»¹. During the decade after the collapse of Soviet Union this hope of peace died away and was written off by new different conflicts.

The Examples of Rwanda, Kosovo and Georgia

Three years after the signature in 1991 of START I (*Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty*), the Rwandan genocide broke out marking a shift in the international context.

Essentially, 800000 members of the Tutsi minority in the country were butchered by Hutu parts of the population, in less than one year of violence against civilians. The analytical point of interest for this study, may be summarized as follows:

1. Q.v. Istituto di Ricerche Internazionali Archivio Disarmo, The START Treaty on the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Weapons – The Treaty of Prague between the United States of America and the Russian Federation, Rome 2010, p. 3.

- events happened in a third-world country;
- lack of concrete military capabilities;
- lack of solid police capabilities;
- ability to organize very effective paramilitary militias like *Interahamwe* and *Impuzamugambi*²;
- clear context of civil war including a humanitarian crisis;
- lack of intervention of conventional military forces and of an international presence.

The second example is the Kosovo conflict. This conflict is built on a wide range of local situations of differentiation that had lain dormant under dictatorial regimes spurred by the former soviet institutions. The dormancy came to an explosive end after the collapse of the Soviet Union.

Aspects of main interest are:

- a new idea of political entity. Yugoslavia was created as federal state after the First World War in order to federate the Slavic populations of the southern Balkans under the banner of political ideology. However those populations were different in terms of culture, religion and history. The conflicts in the Balkans have shown that old models of political entity are outdated. New values have greater importance;
- a large number of international refugees and civilian victims.

2. Q.v. M. FUSASCHI, *Hutu-Tutsi. At the roots of the Rwandan Genocide*, Bollati Boringhieri, Milan 2000; J. HATZFELD, *With Machete Blows. Floor to the Executors of the Genocide in Rwanda*, Bompiani, Milan 2004; A.C. BERT, *Impuzamugambi*, International Book Marketing Service Limited, London 2011, *passim*.

- extended use of military forces by NATO³ but with a clear asymmetry between the operational conduct of the parties. The Yugoslav Armed Force in fact deployed the third Yugoslav army, responsible for operations in Kosovo, while NATO definitively returned to the theories of Douhet on air power and bombing with strategic importance.

Every war is asymmetrical in nature because it nearly always ends in one party which succumbs to the opposite party. Such asymmetry however is not only attributable to war and conflict, but should also extend to other areas including asymmetry in values. Douhet's extraordinary intuition involved foreseeing the way air interventions could revolutionize conflicts. If, traditionally, a war was considered to involve two rivals confronting each other on a battlefield, the air strike allowed the targeting of other areas which were considered more strategic than the strictly military targets of the actual battlefield itself. Taking into account the full range of capabilities of the enemy in battle (political, diplomatic, military economic and availability of intelligence), the air intervention can easily disable the economic or political engine of the enemy long before the armies are engaged in actual combat. Douhet proved not only a far-sighted tactician but also as the forefather of new military technology deployed for strategic ends. He simply transposed the Clausewitz logic of war to the use of aircraft: to make the will of the enemy conforms to your own and in so doing, to deploy all means available, given that international law can more easily be assimilated to the rule of the stronger party. The extraordinary effectiveness of an air strike as Douhet realized from the start, is based on not only a means of firing "projectiles" whether

3. On the legitimacy of the NATO intervention in Kosovo, see M.C. CICIRIELLO, *Lezioni di diritto internazionale*, Editoriale Scientifica, Naples 2010, pp. 279–281.

missiles, bombs or directional weaponry, but upon the ability to guarantee widespread dominance over enemy territory. Whereas the battleship or armoured vehicle can only act as the vector for firing projectiles at the enemy, air superiority has allowed circumvention of the enemy lines from overhead, piercing them and utilizing the third dimension which bears no terrestrial or maritime limits as well as deploying a fourth dimension as well — the time factor.⁴

- large deployment of technology. During the military operations in Kosovo, an information war was also fought by the media including on internet. Prevalent actions on internet included information, propaganda and psychological warfare⁵.

4. N. DE SCALZI, G. CAMBI, *Aeronautica e potere aereo: interview with Generale Preziosa*, in «Meridiani Relazioni Internazionali», dated 25.03.2011, web site <http://www.meridianionline.org/2011/03/25/aeronautica-potere-aereo-intervista-al-generale-preziosa/>.

5. «For the Kosovar side, the “war on the Internet” began within the region, mainly through two sites (<http://www.kosovo.com> and <http://www.radio21.net>). Both of these sites published a sort of daily news bulletin reporting on Serb “ethnic cleansing” and, later, the fighting in the area, in addition to files of a general nature. Their accounts, even if undoubtedly partisan, were particularly important because they provided news from a theatre where all the other information sources had either been expelled or silenced. But this did not occur until the bombing started: the reporting comes to a halt on 24 March for [kosovo.com](http://www.kosovo.com) and on 25 March for [radio21.net](http://www.radio21.net); the two sites are not cited in the list supplied by CNN (see Window 1), probably because they were no longer in operation when the list was drawn up. What may have happened to the operators can only be imagined. The sites (now present on the network like two extinguished stars from which light arrives even after their disappearance: see Wilson, note 1) still contain all the issues of the news bulletins preceding those dates, going back to 1997. The Kosovars continued to publish daily bulletins on two other sites, however, one very likely located in Albania or Macedonia (<http://www.kosovo.org>, or <http://www.alb-net.com/kcc>), the other perhaps in Kosovo in territory controlled by the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA or UCK: <http://www.fas.org/irp/world/para/kla.htm>). On the first site a

The third example comprises the military operations in Georgia during 2008. In this military context we find:

- *psychological warfare*. In this military operation context both the Georgians and Russians extensively used ex-

search program for missing relatives also appears to be active. Obviously, all the Serbian government sites listed in Window 1 are still in operation and are updated daily. The most important Serb dissident site, Radio B92, had a different experience. This site began as an independent radio station and then, in the face of government repression, became an internet site, illustrating the process I mentioned earlier. Maurizio Masetta (masetta@usa.net) writes: «There is a Belgrade independent radio station, B92, shut down by the Serb militia at the start of the conflict, that continues to transmit its bulletins over the Internet and on an audio link via the satellite of the BBC World Service. In addition, a network of underground radio stations across Europe retransmits its bulletins on short wave». This is the communiqué in which the director of Radio B92 denounces, over the Internet, the regime's action to silence the station: «RADIO B92 CLOSED DOWN AND SEALED OFF. On Friday April 2, at 09.00 CET, court officials together with uniformed and plain clothes policemen delivered to Radio B92's Director — Sasa Mirkovic — an order from the court announcing his dismissal as the station's Director. The decision was taken by the government — controlled Council of Youth, the founder of B92. The Council replaced Mr. Mirkovic with Mr. Aleksander Nikacevic. The police then sealed off the studio and offices of B92, banning the station from broadcasting. Shortly after, the station's new director — Mr. Nikacevic — issued an order in the presence of inspectors to all B92 staff to show up for work on Monday April, 5. STRUGGLE CONTINUES. WE SHALL NEVER SURRENDER. RADIO B92, BELGRADE, SERBIA». However, fifteen days after the above announcement no other update had been made on the Internet site, a sign that Radio B92 did not manage to survive even on the Web. The “war on the Internet” takes place mainly on the level of news, because the target of the news is the “netizen” who sifts the network for news he can't get from other sources, or thinks he is getting in an insufficient or distorted way, or wants to obtain on his own, giving rise to that personal, interactive process to which the Internet owes much of its popularity. News, therefore, not punditry or assessments, which are available in large supply from the traditional sources. As an example of this type of war, below is a comparison of the news furnished by sites on the different sides on the same day, 4 April 1992 (2 April for Radio B92, since it was closed on the 4th)». G. CAFORIO, *Kosovo: War on the Internet*, International Security, Lubiana, Mass Media and Public Opinion — University of Ljubljana, 2000, p. 3.

tensively media resources to *discredit the opponent and gain the support of public opinion. Using themes such as war crimes to accuse the opponent respectively. Crimes that were resized by subsequent investigations;*

- cyberwarfare. The war in Georgia marks the first–ever use of telematics as military attacks. «From the first day of fighting the Georgian networks were submerged by attacks similar to those that hit the Estonia 2007»⁶;
- conventional war operations. The 58th Russian army collided with the Georgian army. This latter enjoyed the support of Western countries, especially the US–sponsored *Georgia Train and Equip Program* (GTEP). The GTEP had allowed the Georgians to prepare 2400 units for anti–terrorist operations and conventional combat, company level. It had been followed by another programme to train three brigades for counter insurgency. In essence, the Georgian army had 28000 soldiers (5 brigades), 244 tanks (T–72 and T–55), 78 BMPs (amphibious tracked infantry fighting vehicles), more than 200 artillery and 180 mortars and 70 airplanes and helicopters⁷.

It was a war between conventional forces and new elements in war operations.

The three examples are representative of the wide range of types of disputes that have occurred in recent years and of their different degree of intensity presenting different security gaps.

6. E. DE GAETANO, A. LOPREIATO, *The Wars of the Russian Federation*, Mursia, Milan 2011, p. 156.

7. *Ibidem*, pp. 144–148.

The end of the “Balance of Power” complicated and expanded the need for security. This has expanded the number of conflicts and created new concepts of war. It has come even with new forms of struggle⁸. New security tools are needed to be able to deal with all these new requirements:

unconventional warfare, atypical models⁹, non-functional methodologies, connection with political and criminal structures, new social phenomena that could be used as instruments of menace.

8. M. SHEEHAN, *The Balance of Power: History & Theory*, Routledge, London 2000, p. 35.

9. Q.v. D. CIAMPINI, *Reflections on atypical organizational models*, in «La Rassegna dell'Arma dei Carabinieri», I, 2011, *passim*.