Abstract
Against the idea that struggles for recognition constitute an ethical moment in the development of moral life, this text argues, following Hobbes rather than Hegel that conflicts do not in themselves have any moral value. Hobbes’s naturalism which is criticized by Hegel and Honneth should be understood as the expression of his refusal to find a moral value in violence and conflicts. Advocates of the “struggle for recognition” misinterpret the fact that mutual recognition often helps to put an end to a conflict as a proof that the desire for inter–subjective recognition is the cause of the conflict. More importantly they tend to understand recognition as a dual relation while according to Hénaff it can be shown that recognition is a triadic relation in the sense of Peirce and that it is precisely that triadic dimension which allows it to help resolve conflicts.

Keywords: Recognition, Convention, Hobbes, Triadic Relation, Israel–Palestinian Conflict